

BEYOND INDUSTRIAL BOUNDARIES: TERRITORIAL RESILIENCE IN NATECH RISK MANAGEMENT

LA GESTIONE DEL RISCHIO NATECH

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OUTLINE

- *Resilience Engineering in Process Industries*
- *Comprehensive Natech Risk Management Approach*
 - *Infrastructure*
 - *Organisation and Management*
 - *Risk Communication and Governance*
 - *External Environment*
- *Outlook*



INTRODUCTION

- Addressing **safety** in complex **socio-technical systems** in the process industries (SHIRALI ET AL., 2016)

Challenge

- Limitations of **traditional risk analysis** and **probabilistic safety assessments**

Approach

- Emergence of **Resilience Engineering (RE)** as a new research field at the turn of the century



CONCEPT OF RESILIENCE

Definition (Aven, 2011)

- “the ability of a system to **withstand** a **major disruption** within **acceptable degradation parameters** and to **recover** within an **acceptable time**, and composite **costs**, and **risks**” (AVEN, 2011)
- Important implications for **hazardous facilities**, such as **chemical** and **petrochemical industries**



Application of RE in the Process Industries

- **Goal:** Improve **capacity** to **adapt** to **emerging risks** and **manage** inherently **risky systems**
- **Focus:** **Risk contributors** like **process failures**, **organisational issues**, and **human performance**
- Continuous **Monitoring**: Essential due to omnipresent **environmental changes** (BERGSTRÖMVAN ET AL. 2015)



CRITIQUE OF RESILIENCE APPROACHES

Focus on Individual Installations

- **Overlooked** Aspects: Crucial **interconnections** between **organisational, infrastructural, environmental, and community** resilience
- Importance of **Integration**: Necessary for **comprehensive risk governance** and managing **complex, nonlinear interactions** within systems
- **Gaps in Planning: Business continuity and recovery plans** often lack consideration of these interconnections (BABA ET AL. 2014)
- **Natech** Risks: Emphasis needed on **area-wide risk assessments** (KRAUSMANN ET AL., 2017; OECD, 2023)
 - **Growing populations** and **industrialisation** in **areas prone** to natural hazards



INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK COMPONENTS

Resilience in Process Safety

- **Ability** to **prevent** and **mitigate accidents** affecting **facility integrity** (SALZANO ET AL., 2014)
- Importance of **Prevention** and **Preparedness**
- Equally vital as **post-impact response** and **recovery strategies**

Comprehensive Risk Management Framework

- Interaction of **socio-technical systems** (technical and organizational components)
- **Governance, risk communication** and **community participation**
- Surrounding **environment** and **assets**
- **Purpose: Evaluate industrial sites' performance** in Natech scenarios



NATECH RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (SUAREZ-PABA ET AL., 2020; 2022)



INFRASTRUCTURE – I

Severe Consequences

- Natech accidents severely impact physical infrastructure
 - i) **Process equipment**, ii) **building infrastructure** and iii) **internal utilities**

Risk Assessment Methodologies

- Focus on **securing industrial process equipment** to **prevent** hazardous material **releases** (ANTONIONI ET AL. 2007; NECCI ET AL. 2013; LANDUCCI ET AL. 2016)
 - Various **methodologies** depending on the **hazard type** (mostly on earthquakes and floods)
 - Important to also **consider building infrastructure** and **internal utilities** for **overall resilience** (COOK ET AL. 2017; MUKHERJEE ET AL. 2018)

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INFRASTRUCTURE – II

Mitigation Strategies

- Continuously revise and apply **building standards** (KRAUSMANN & NECCI, 2021)
- **Backup systems** for essential services (e.g., water, electricity, communications) (KRAUSMANN & NECCI, 2021)
- **Reliability** of the **technical safety barriers** in the aftermath of the natural hazard (MISURI ET AL., 2020)

Evaluation

- Analyses potential **accident scenarios** using **screening methods, checklists**, and **rating systems** to assess **readiness** and **impact** on **casualties, downtime**, and **financial losses**



ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT – I

Human/Organisational Factors

- **Often neglected** in **'traditional'** risk assessments (JAIN ET AL. 2018)
 - **Integrative socio-technical** approach is crucial for effective **hazard identification** and **prevention**
- Impacts from Natech accidents extend beyond physical damage, **affecting operational continuity**
 - e.g., from **indirect damages** and **operational issues** causing additional losses to **critical service interruptions** and **business disruption**



ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT – II

Organisational Resilience


- **Planning** and **adaptive capacity** are vital for **mitigating disaster effects** and **ensuring business continuity** (STEPHENSON ET AL. 2010)
- Holistic risk management strategies enhance **industrial adaptability** and **economic resilience**, fostering better **disaster preparedness** and **recovery capacity** (VILLA ET AL. 2016)
 - Consistent focus on **disaster preparedness** and **prevention, emergency planning** and **business continuity plans**



RISK COMMUNICATION AND GOVERNANCE – I

Risk Information Disclosure

- Increasing focus on **disaster risk reduction** and **open communication channels**
 - e.g., Seveso Directive, Aarhus Convention, Sendai Framework, OECD Guidelines



Risk Communication

- **Effective, two-way** and **ethical** risk communication (TZIOUTZIOS ET AL. 2022)
 - Basis of **community right-to-know initiatives**
- **Mutual learning process** based on **public concerns**; 'what people **want** to know' (RENN & KLINKE, 2015)
- Community Preparedness: Prior chemical risk **information disclosure** enhances **community disaster preparedness** and **informed decision-making** (TZIOUTZIOS ET AL., 2022; TZIOUTZIOS & CRUZ, 2021)

RISK COMMUNICATION AND GOVERNANCE – II

Transparency

- **Fosters trust** and **stakeholder cooperation**, essential for risk management and governance
 - Necessary for handling **complex** and **uncertain risks**, requiring **continuous dialogue** and **social learning** (SHIMIZU & CLARK, 2019)

Participatory Approaches

- Advocates for **inclusive risk management** involving all **stakeholders**, promoting **democratic decision-making** (TZIOUTZIOS & CRUZ, 2021)
- **Stimulating public discourse** about risk: **citizen forums**, negotiated **rule-making exercises**, mediation or advisory **committees**, including experts and stakeholders (RENN, 2017; RENN & KLINKE, 2013)

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT – I

External Environment Components

- **Territorial resilience elements** broad categories
- **External Secondary Hazards**
- **External Lifeline Disruption**, and
- **Community-Environment Interactions**

Natech Scenarios

- Industrial facilities' **interaction** with **surroundings** is important
 - Urban areas face heightened risk due to **dense population** and **industry coexistence**
 - **Poor community-industry interaction** can lead to **safety barrier failures** (e.g., unaware public of chemical risks and protective measures)
- Existing **methodologies focus** on **internal facility hazards**, neglecting surrounding environment impacts
- Risks from **external cascading/domino effects** often not systematically analysed due to data **complexity** and **scarcity**



EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT – II


- Natural disasters can **damage access roads, critical infrastructure, delaying** and **complicating emergency response** (SALZANO ET AL. 2013; KRAUSMANN ET AL. 2017)
- Natech events cause **long-term economic effects**, including **labour market changes** in **neighboring communities** (OHTAKE, 2012)

Wide-Area Planning

- Industrial facilities should develop **emergency response plans** considering conjoint scenarios of both **natural disasters** and **technological accidents**
 - Beyond EQ and floods as per Seveso Directive, e.g. storm wind
- Need for **systemic risk** approaches (RENIERS AND COZZANI 2013) → Methodologies for **addressing cascading multi-hazard risks** in National Risk Assessment (GIRGIN ET AL., 2019)



RISK INFLUENCING FACTORS



Risk Influencing Factor (RIF)

- ‘an **aspect** of a system or an activity that **affects** the **risk level** of this system/activity’ (ØIEN, 2001)
 - **Influence** risk scenarios and **inhibit** the effective operation of **barrier systems** (SONNEMANS ET AL., 2010)



Critical Lifelines: Natech Implications

- E.g., poor **vegetation management** along power grids (TZIOUTZIOS ET AL. 2023)
- Sudden **power outages** can lead to hazardous material **releases**
 - Even **without direct impact** from a natural hazard on in situ **industrial equipment** by disrupting operations
 - **Unavailability** of **safety barriers** when most needed
- Poor **safety culture** in the organisation/industrial sector



1* <https://www.clayjenkins.com/blog/electrocution-injuries-from-trees-contacting-power-lines-2>

THE WAY FORWARD IN NATECH RESILIENCE

Holistic Approach

- Emphasises the **significance** of **comprehensive** approaches in managing Natech accident risks

System Complexity


- Acknowledges the **complexity** of **Natech accidents** and the **limitations** of **dissecting risks** into **individual components**

Comprehensive Understanding

- Highlights the need to understand the **interactions** and **contextual settings** of each **component** for effective risk assessment

Shifting Risk Management Perspectives

- **Step forward** rather than a definitive solution, paving the way for **more sophisticated disaster resilience** methods



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THANK YOU

ありがとうございました

Tusen takk

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