- Info
Conal Condren
Honorary Professor Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities; Emeritus Scientia Professor University of New South Wales.
He works both as a political philosopher and intellectual historian. Chronologically his work has ranged from the 14th to the 18th centuries and within this period he has concentrated mainly on persons and problems seen as raising broader issues. He has developed his own approach to the nature and study of intellectual history requiring the integration of materials beyond the boundaries of “politics” or “theory” and the layering of different types of context. His work has continuity of theme and places emphasis on pragmatics (word use and change) and historical interpretation. He has also published in non-historical areas of political theory/philosophy: one major work was largely taken up with the logical analysis of interpretative concepts.
Academic Myth and the Political Origins of a Concept.
29 June 2022
Sala del Teatro
The lineage of humour theory from Plato to Kant is familiar. My argument however, is that this is a genealogical myth, a creature of academic politics, advertising and legitimating a new field of university study and its concerns. Such promotional pedigrees are common in academia. In this case, there is a specific mechanism: the treatment of laughter as an expression of humour. This allows a prestigious pedigree to reinforce the commonly asserted nostrum that humour is a universal.
If we do not project a universal awareness of humour from its localised ubiquity, then we can ask afresh when and why was a concept of it first developed. The general shape of the narrative will be familiar but needs placing in the context of laughter being taken as an expression of aggression, despite its recognised physiological benefits.
Freed from popular humoral theory, the word humour first became an occasional synonym for jest in the mid-seventeenth century; then by the early eighteenth, it is sometimes used as a covering term for a variable range of more specific phenomena, such as jesting, facetiousness, occasionally satire, and often wit. This process was the creation of a rough semantic field that, with augmented content, is now in use. A sense of humour only comes in the nineteenth century, a consequence of an extension of the meaning of sense to mean faculty, so becoming of interest in the emerging discipline of psychology. It is also only from the nineteenth century that humour becomes a loan word in many other languages, sometimes with altered meaning.
Politics may also help explain why the invention of humour, as we now understand it, was a contingent English language phenomenon. Seventeenth-century England was notoriously violent and insecure. The assumed aggression of laughter was seen as part of the problem. Humour, came to sanction certain sorts of laughter as safe, just as there were places in which it might be contained as acceptable.
I suggest, then, a duality of political explanation at odds with the mythology of humour studies: academic politics helps account for a spurious tradition of humour theory, while the conceptualisation of humour became an answer to political insecurity exacerbated by the aggression thought inherent in laughter. If this argument is along the right lines, the implications for the routine affirmation that humour is a universal should be obvious.